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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Christian Fuchs and David Chandler
1. Introduction
In May 2017, The Economist’s front cover headlined a feature on Big Data titled 
‘The World’s Most Valuable Resource’. The feature argued that data is the world’s 
new oil. Data would drive development in the twenty-first century in the same 
way as oil transformed the world’s economy and society in the early twentieth 
century. Such popular discourses claim that Big Data enables new ways of gen-
erating knowledge that will lead to innovative and creative possibilities.
In the same month as The Economist ran this feature on Big Data, we organ-
ised the interdisciplinary symposium ‘Digital Objects, Digital Subjects: Activ-
ism, Research & Critique in the Age of Big Data Capitalism’ at the University of 
Westminster (May 20-21, 2017)1. The symposium was hosted by the Westmin-
ster Institute for Advanced Studies and the Department of Politics and Interna-
tional Relations. It featured ten presentations by leading international experts 
on the study of the digital in politics, the economy and society. This edited 
collection is a product of the conference, and provides further reflections on 
the presentations given.
We especially thank Denise Rose Hansen from the Westminster Institute for 
Advanced Studies, who brilliantly managed the organisation of the conference 
and supported us in bringing this book to publication. We also thank Andrew 
Lockett from University of Westminster Press for his interest in publishing this 
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book and his editorial help. We are also grateful to our colleagues from the 
Communication and Media Research Institute and the Centre for the Study 
of Democracy who have acted as chairs and respondents, as well as to the 
speakers, contributors, volunteers, interpreters, technicians and administrators 
whose work helped to make the conference a big success.
Many claims have been made about the emergence of a ‘digital turn’ that is said to 
have radically transformed the possibilities for politics by undermining traditional 
modernist binaries of subject/object, state/society, politics/economics, public/ 
private, consumption/production, time/space, mind/body, labour/leisure, culture/
nature, human/posthuman. This turn has run through several phases, including 
cybernetics, automation technologies, mainframe computers, databases, artificial 
intelligence, personal computers, the World Wide Web, smart phones, geographical 
information systems, social media, targeted digital advertising, self-quantification, 
Big Data analytics, Cloud computing and the Internet of Things.
This collected volume presents interdisciplinary assessments of the digital’s 
impact on society. The contributions interrogate the claims of both digital 
 optimism and digital pessimism. Digital optimists assert that digital techno-
logies have radically transformed the world, promising new forms of commu-
nity, alternative ways of knowing and sensing, creative innovation, participatory 
culture, networked activism and distributed democracy. Digital pessimists ar-
gue that digital technologies have not brought about positive change, but have 
rather deepened and extended domination through new forms of control. 
The pessimists speak of networked authoritarianism, digital dehumanisation, 
 alienation 2.0, networked exploitation and the rise of the surveillance society.
The chapters engage with questions of the digital in respect to activism, re-
search and critique. They engage with the possibilities, potentials, pitfalls, limits 
and ideologies of digital activism. They reflect on whether computational social 
science, the digital humanities and ubiquitous datafication enable new research 
approaches or result in a digital positivism that threatens the independence of 
critical research and is likely to bring about about the death of the social sci-
ences and humanities. The volume explores the futures, places and possibilities 
of critique in the age of digital subjects and digital objects.
The main question this book asks is: what are the key implications of the digi-
tal for subjects, objects and society? This question is examined through three 
lenses: digital capitalism/Big Data capitalism, digital labour, and digital politics. 
These three perspectives form three sections in the book. Each section consists 
of six chapters: three presentations each followed by a comment or response. 
The first section focuses on society in its totality as digital capitalism. Digital 
capitalism exists wherever capitalist society is shaped by computer technologies. 
In recent years, Big Data has become an important aspect of digital capitalism, 
leading to the emergence of a new dimension of Big Data capitalism. The three 
contributions by David Chandler, Christian Fuchs and Paul Rekret, as well as the 
three comments (Christian Fuchs’ comments on David Chandler,  Chandler’s on 
Fuchs, Robert Cowley’s on Paul Rekret) focus on digital capitalism in general, as 
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well as aspects of Big Data. Chandler discusses how Big Data capitalism brings 
about a new form of digital governmentality focused on correlation. Fuchs ar-
gues that Karl Marx helps us to critically understand digital capitalism and Big 
Data capitalism. Paul Rekret criticises the posthumanist approaches of Donna 
Haraway and Bruno Latour in the context of digital  capitalism.
When analysing capitalism critically, we are dealing – as the subtitle of Marx’s 
opus magnum Capital indicates – with the critique of political economy. Politi-
cal economy has an economic side and a political dimension, and these inter-
act. Sections II and III approach digital political economy. Section II focuses on 
digital labour and Section III gives attention to digital politics.
The three chapters in Section II – by Kylie Jarrett, Phoebe Moore and Jack L. 
Qiu – focus on a range of issues concerning labour and class in the digital age: 
the digital houseworker (Jarrett), the digital worker’s quantified self (Moore), 
and slavery in the digital age (Qiu). Joanna Boehnert comments on Kylie 
 Jarrett, Elisabetta Brighi on Phoebe Moore, and Peter Goodwin on Jack L. Qiu.
The three chapters in Section III – by Jodi Dean, Paolo Gerbaudo and Toni 
Negri – discuss aspects of digital politics, namely social movements in the con-
text of communicative capitalism (Dean), political parties in the digital age 
(Gerbaudo), and the question of how social struggles can advance digital alter-
natives (Negri). Paulina Tambakaki comments on Jodi Dean, Anastasia Kavada 
on Paolo Gerbaudo, and Christian Fuchs on Toni Negri.
Taken together, the three sections, with their nine presentations and accom-
panying comments show that we face a contradiction of subjects and objects 
in contemporary digital capitalism, and that structures of domination and ex-
ploitation threaten social cohesion and democracy. Digital domination and the 
exploitation of digital labour are the hegemonic structural forces shaping digi-
tal capitalism. But the situation is not hopeless, because there are potentials for 
struggles that can establish alternatives. For example, potentials for establishing 
a society of the digital commons are emerging within digital capitalism. Toni 
Negri, in his contribution, therefore asks how we can politically appropriate 
digital machines. The interest in advancing the digital commons and establish-
ing a society of the commons is a political perspective that holds together many 
of the contributions to this book.
In the remainder of this introduction to the collected volume, we will discuss 
the relationship of digital subjects and digital objects (Section 2) and the notion 
of Big Data capitalism (Section 3), which form the background and context of 
the nine presentations and responses in this book.
2. Digital Subjects/Digital Objects
This volume engages with the changes that objects and subjects are under going 
in digital society. It asks what are the key implications of Big Data and the digi-
tal for subjects, objects and society.
4 Digital Objects, Digital Subjects
Computing and digitality are not exclusively phenomena of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. Digital logic has a much longer history. Already in 1703, 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz suggested basing mathematics, not on the decimal 
system, but on binary logic: ‘But instead of the progression of tens, I have for 
many years used the simplest progression of all, which proceeds by twos, hav-
ing found that it is useful for the perfection of the science of numbers. Thus I 
use no other characters in it bar 0 and 1, and when reaching two, I start again’ 
(Leibniz 1703, np). In the history of computing, pioneering work was done 
by Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace in the nineteenth century. Babbage and 
Lovelace were ahead of their time because the technological standards of the 
nineteenth century were focused on what Marx (1867/1976) termed large-scale 
industry, rather than building a computer. Computing devices as we know them 
today go back to Alan Turing’s concept of the Turing Machine that he invented 
in 1936. The digital logic of zeros and ones is a key feature of the way a Turing 
Machine operates. During the Second World War, Turing built  computers for 
the British military in order to decipher the Nazis’ encoded messages. In this 
light, the Second World War was not merely a war of military might, but also 
the first computational and digital war.
The example of the Turing Machine indicates that computing and the digital 
always stand in a broader social, political, economic and ideological context. 
Today, digital computing is ubiquitous and shapes all aspects of contemporary 
life, including capitalism, governance, everyday life, culture, education, welfare 
and science.
Technologies have always impacted human capacities. We cannot, therefore, 
easily separate technological objects from human subjects. The computer, the 
digital machine, has from its beginning changed the way subjects act and in-
teract in the world. In the history of warfare, we have gone from hand-to-hand 
combat to killing at a distance through computerised technologies that enable 
smart bombs, killer robots, drone assassinations and pre-emptive warfare. 
These technologies do not only make warfare more distanced in space and 
time, but they also distance it morally. The example of digital warfare shows us 
that digital machines change the way subjects and objects relate to each other 
and are constituted.
This edited collection focuses on the latest stage of digital life and the digital 
transformation of society. We call this latest stage ‘Big Data capitalism’. Algo-
rithms that generate Big Data have today become central to political and ethical 
concerns, but there is no clear consensus on the distinctiveness of algorithmic 
knowledge.
The United Nations argues that Big Data analytics are central to solving 
the world’s most pressing problems, from food shortages to conflicts and en-
vironmental crises. For example, the UN Global Pulse project developed a 
model of real-time food price changes by collecting and analysing more than 
40,000  tweets about food prices in Jakarta, Indonesia. Less altruistically, Big 
Data is also crucial for Facebook and its users who share over 5 billion posts and 
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upload more than 300 million images per day. More than 500,000  comments 
are posted per minute. Facebook’s 2016 advertising profits of US$ 10.2 billion 
were generated by targeting users based on the analysis of Big Data generated 
through users’ activities and content.
‘Smart cities’ like London and Barcelona deploy Big Data analytics to more 
efficiently administer these urban complexes. Transport for London (TfL) cap-
tures and analyses 20 million Oyster travel card taps per day in order to manage 
traffic flows and innovate transportation. In Barcelona, more than 20,000 smart 
meters are installed on bins, streetlights and other pieces of infrastructure, col-
lecting socio-environmental Big Data. At Walmart, the world’s largest company 
with a turnover of almost half a trillion US dollars per year, an analytics team 
analyses hundreds of data streams in real time, including customer data, sales 
data, meteorological data, social media data and event and location data, all 
with a view to responding rapidly to emerging trends and thereby increasing 
sales and catering to its customers’ perceived needs.
These examples, in the areas of disaster risk (UN Global Pulse), media and 
communication (Facebook), smart cities (Transport for London) and business 
(Walmart), demonstrate the vast amount, variety and speed of data collection 
and analysis. Big Data has transformed our ways of knowing in different fields, 
and algorithmic knowledge is impacting on everyday practices and processes. 
This book aims to clarify what is at stake when knowledge, subjects, objects and 
society become digital and algorithmic. Algorithmic detection of correlations 
across time and space enables Big Data approaches to operate in ‘real-time’ sce-
narios, as in the examples of food prices in Jakarta, TfL’s data management of 
traffic, Facebook’s advertising practices, and Walmart’s retailing strategies.
Although there is no agreed definition of what Big Data means, it tends to be 
understood as being related to volume, variety and velocity (Kitchin 2014, 68). 
Big Data’s volume refers to datasets so large that they cannot be processed and 
analysed by humans but only by machine-driven algorithms. There is a wide 
variety of sources and types of Big Data. Big Data has a high velocity: it is pro-
duced, circulated and acted upon in real time, and at very high speeds.
Connected digital devices such as CCTV, drone cameras, Internet of Things 
sensors, Twitter, Google, Facebook, smartphones, UN Global Pulse technolo-
gies, smart city technologies, news feeds, weather report stations, demographic 
and population data collectors, price and economic data tools, or Walmart’s 
data collection methods, create constant streams of data. Algorithmic knowl-
edge enables Big Data analytics that are produced by correlating these data 
streams to identify and analyse patterns of occurrences that enable new under-
standings and ways of seeing the world.
In philosophy, the rationalist tradition saw knowledge as existing in fixed 
causal relations and in fixed properties or essences of entities that were inde-
pendent of and prior to experience, while empiricism argued that knowledge 
was experiential, contextual and obtained through the human sense organs. It 
was Immanuel Kant who advanced an epistemology that stressed the importance 
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of the distinction between rational knowledge and sensual knowledge. ‘To the 
extent to which knowledge is subject to the laws of sensuousness it is sensuous; 
to the extent to which it is subject to the laws of intelligence it is intellectual or 
rational’ (Kant 1770, 50). Algorithmic knowledge undermines this distinction.
The algorithm is a notion found in mathematics and computing that has long 
been associated with the pursuit of rational forms of knowledge. ‘An algorithm 
is a reliable, definable procedure for solving a problem. The idea of the algo-
rithm goes back to the beginnings of mathematics’ (Henderson 2009, 7). Today, 
algorithms not only calculate existing data but also develop new forms of ‘sen-
sual’ or ‘empirical’ knowledge by finding correlations. Algorithmic knowledge 
seeks to find patterns and relationships, enabling new ways of seeing, sensing, 
responding and adapting to life in its complex emergence.
In this process, the Kantian distinction between rational knowledge ob-
tained through the brain’s reflective capacity, and experiential knowledge ob-
tained through the sense organs, breaks down. Digital machines generate Big 
Data through sensors, and thereby simulate and automate human experience. 
At the same time, ethical rationality is increasingly perceived as residing in 
machines, which results in automated decision-making. Knowing and sensing 
seem to become a unified algorithmic procedure that resides across the human/ 
machinic divide. This volume takes a deeper look at digital transformations 
and asks what their consequences are for our understanding of what subjects 
and objects are, and how they operate in society.
Big Data studies is a rapidly expanding research field (see Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier 2013, Kitchin 2014, Mosco 2014) that deals with how Big Data and 
algorithmic knowledge transform the economy, politics, culture and the envi-
ronment. This growing volume of research is matched by publications about Big 
Data. In the summer of 2017, Web of Science listed approximately 5,800  articles 
published in the years 2014, 2015, 2016 that have ‘Big Data’ in their titles. Impor-
tant fields where Big Data research has had an impact include disaster research, 
media/communication studies, smart cities, and management and organisation 
studies.
In disaster research, Big Data is increasingly deployed to predict and pre-
vent disasters and minimise their impacts on humans and nature. Big Data is 
also used in disaster response, where Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (also called 
drones) gather data about disaster sites, while machine-learning algorithms 
identify patterns in disaster-related data. Digital humanitarianism is increas-
ingly deployed before and after disasters. Digital humanitarianism ‘examines 
how new uses of technology and vast quantities of digital data are transforming 
the way societies prepare for, respond to, cope with, and ultimately understand 
humanitarian disasters’ (Meier 2015, xi). In disaster and political research, Big 
Data analytics and new information technologies are increasingly perceived 
as essential when it comes to dealing with a wide range of international issues, 
such as development (Coyle and Meier 2009), conflict (Karlsrud 2014, USIP 
2013, Himelfarb 2014) and natural disasters (Meier 2015). Big Data analytics 
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are key to the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals: ‘More diverse, integrated, timely and trustworthy information 
can lead to better decision-making and real-time citizen feedback. This in turn 
enables individuals, public and private institutions, and companies to make 
choices that are good for them and for the world they live in (UN 2014)’. The 
United Nations has called for ‘a data revolution for sustainable development’, 
arguing that ‘improving data is a development agenda in its own right’, and that 
the divides between rich and poor can be mitigated through the provision of 
more data that will enable more efficient adaptation to the emergence of prob-
lems at all levels of society (UN 2014). Indeed, the ‘data gap’ is increasingly held 
to be the cause of growing inequalities (Stuart et al. 2015).
In media and communication studies, Big Data is used for generating new un-
derstandings of political, economic and everyday life through communication 
on Twitter, Facebook and other social media platforms. Big Data has changed 
human communication’s actors, structures, systems, contents, effects, contexts, 
and power structures. boyd and Crawford (2012) argue that Big Data creates 
challenges and opportunities for communication research, knowledge, research 
ethics and power structures. Communication research about Big Data has, 
for example, focused on online agenda-setting and online attention (Neuman 
et al. 2014), Big Data analytics in targeted online advertising (Couldry & Turow 
2014), Big Data’s aspects of communication power (Andrejevic 2014), data jour-
nalism (Fink & Anderson 2015), automated text extraction and classification as 
tools for measuring culture (Bail 2014), the analysis of political communication 
during election campaigns (Larsson & Moe 2012), and the prediction of users’ 
attitudes and behaviours (such as their political affiliation, see Colleoni et al. 
2014). In 2014, the journal Big Data & Society was founded. Between 2014 and 
2016 it published more than 130 articles, demonstrating that Big Data com-
munication research is a booming sub-field of media/communication studies.
The study of smart cities and citizen sensors analyses how Big Data is trans-
forming urban life (Greenfield 2013, Kitchin 2014, Krivy 2016, Thrift 2014, 
Townsend 2013). The development and application of Big Data is driving a 
transformation in the understanding of city governance and planning. This 
transformation is taking place with the aid of ubiquitous sensing technology, 
often termed the Internet of Things, whereby digital devices connected to 
every day objects, such as roads, litterbins and street lights, enable new forms of 
city management. Much of the research into these applications of Big Data ar-
gues that new digital technologies can enable citizens and governments to con-
nect in more meaningful ways, empower communities, distribute knowledge, 
and allow better control over public goods and services. Already the majority 
of the world’s population live in cities, and by 2050 it is projected that 75% of 
the global population will be urban. Many cities around the world are seeking 
to become ‘smart’ by using networked, digital technologies and urban Big Data 
to tackle a range of issues, such as improving governance and service deliv-
ery, creating more resilient critical infrastructure, growing the local economy, 
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becoming more sustainable, improving mobility, offering greater transparency 
and accountability for collective activities, enhancing the quality of life, and 
increasing safety and security. In short, the desire is to use digital technology 
to improve the lives of citizens, advance city management and foster economic 
development.
In the field of management and organisation studies, Big Data is deployed 
for understanding consumers and users’ individual preferences, tastes, life-
styles, behavioural choices, attitudes, interests, and so on. This application 
of Big Data to the individual enables differentiated pricing and targeted and 
personalised advertising. Big Data also transforms every aspect of the pro-
duction process, including the surveillance of employees and the monitoring 
and datafication of products, transport and logistics. Big Data is also used for 
understanding and predicting the development of financial markets. George 
et al. (2014) argue that Big Data enables organisations to identity new mar-
kets and products, gather new management knowledge, and track members 
of workgroups. Other research focuses on how to use Big Data for manag-
ing a product’s lifecycle (Li et al. 2015) as well as managing the supply chain 
(Hazen et al. 2014). Google’s chief economist Hal R. Varian (2014) argues 
that Big Data analytics should be used as a standard research method in eco-
nomics (see also Einav & Levin 2014). Another strand of research has been 
termed consumer analytics (Erevelles et al. 2016). This focuses on the analy-
sis of consumer interests and satisfaction, and on identifying brand strategies 
(Tirunillai & Tellis 2014).
Even this brief summary shows that Big Data research is a rapidly growing 
research field. At the same time, however, it is highly fragmented. Big Data 
researchers are often preoccupied with their complex data collection and analy-
sis processes. They rarely find the time or opportunity to reflect on the broad 
changes that theory, methodologies, knowledge and society are undergoing 
in the age of algorithmic knowledge. This collection seeks to rectify this gap 
through surveying the application of Big Data and new forms of algorithmic 
governance through the lenses of digital capitalism, labour, and politics. 
The former editor of Wired magazine, Chris Anderson, famously claimed 
that Big Data and the development of algorithmic knowledge puts an end 
to  the need for theory, causal modelling and hypothesising: ‘With enough 
data, the numbers speak for themselves […] [When] faced with massive data, 
this [traditional] approach to science – hypothesize, model, test – is becoming 
obsolete’ (Anderson, 2008). Big Data promises an epistemological revolution. 
It is claimed that Big Data will make existing methodological approaches in 
the social and natural sciences obsolete, and will mean the death of theory. At 
any rate Big Data, with its focus on context and revealing unseen relations, is 
increasingly breaking down disciplinary boundaries.
Savage and Burrows (2007) discuss how research methods, theories and epis-
temologies have changed in the age of Big Data. They argue that ‘the repertoires’ 
of research methods ‘need to be rethought’ so that there is ‘greater reflection on 
Introduction 9
[…] the proliferation of social data gathered by others […] [and] a radical mix-
ture of methods coupled with renewed critical reflection’ (Savage and Burrows 
2007, 895–896). Evgeny Morozov (2014) points out that Big Data also poses 
fundamental challenges to ethics and political regulation: ‘Why rely on laws 
when one has sensors and feedback mechanisms? If policy interventions are to 
be – to use the buzzwords of the day – ‘evidence-based’ and ‘results-oriented,’ 
technology is here to help.’ Savage and Burrows stress the importance of Big 
Data methodologies, whereas Morozov (2014) reminds us of the political and 
ethical implications of algorithmic knowledge.
The diverse processes that constitute digital transformations and Big Data 
capitalism have not been adequately engaged with in terms of their episte-
mological, ontological and ethical implications. This volume seeks to address 
this deficiency through nine presentations and responses, which collectively 
use and develop conceptual tools from the fields of critical political economy, 
governmentality studies, political theory and communication theory. Political 
economy is ‘a distinct way of understanding how economies work and how 
they interact with the larger societies around them’ (Wolff and Resnick 2012, 
1). Governmentality studies is a field of inquiry that analyses ‘any method of 
government’ (Foucault 2008, 13), ‘the development of real governmental prac-
tice’ and its rationalisation in ‘the exercise of sovereignty’ (22).
This volume provides an overview of the difference that digital and Big Data 
capitalism has made to politics, activism and theory. It engages with key episte-
mological, ontological and ethical questions arising from the transformations 
of digital subjects and objects. These questions include the following:
•	How does the digital impact the logic of governance and power?
•	How does the digital change the nature of knowledge and the understand-
ing of causation?
•	How does the digital deal with new problems of uncertainty, risk, complex-
ity and unpredictability?
•	How does the digital impact critique, activism and political organisation?
•	How does the digital interact with changes within capitalism and labour?
•	How can critical theories explain the role of the digital in society?
•	How does the digital impact reproduction and gender relations?
•	How does the digital change the relationship between culture and nature, as 
well as between humans and their environment? How does the digital shape 
the Anthropocene?
3. Big Data Capitalism 2
Although most observers of society will agree that capitalism concerns the ac-
cumulation of capital, there is no general agreement on how to define capital or 
who produces it. Marx (1867) and Marxists tend to argue that capital is money 
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that is increased through exploitation of labour and the sale of commodities. 
Followers of Bourdieu (1986) argue that capital is more general, extending to 
the realms of politics and culture. Bourdieu distinguishes between economic, 
political/social and cultural capital, and also uses the notion of symbolic capi-
tal, which he claims interacts with all other forms of capital.
No matter how one defines capital and capitalism, many scholars and observ-
ers agree that capitalism is a societal formation that is based on the logic of the 
accumulation of money and power. It tries to instrumentalise everything for 
this purpose, and therefore produces a highly instrumental society based on 
what Horkheimer (2004) terms instrumental reason.
If capitalism is a societal formation, then digital capitalism may be a stage 
and phase of its development and/or a dimension and mode of the production 
of life and society. In turn, Big Data capitalism is a way of signifying the latest 
development of the digital within the broader context of the economy, politics, 
culture, ideology, domination and exploitation.
The basic sociological question concerning the digital asks at what level of capi-
talism and society we should situate digital transformations. We can speak of four 
main positions. The first argues that the digital constitutes a radical transforma-
tion of society, such that we no longer live in a capitalist or modern society, but 
in a radically new type of society. So for example Nico Stehr (1994) argues that 
the knowledge society means that ‘the age of labor and property is at an end’ 
(iix), and that the ‘emergence of knowledge societies signals first and foremost a 
radical transformation in the structure of the economy’ (10) and, as a result, the 
‘emergence of a new structure and organization of economic activity’ (122). For 
Manuel Castells, writing at the turn of the millennium, the rise of the ‘network 
society’ means that a ‘new world is taking shape’ (Castells 2000, 367). Castells also 
argues that the ‘information technology revolution induced the emergence of in-
formationalism, as the material foundation of a new society’ (Castells 2000, 367).
The second, more critical, position argues that information society dis-
course is a neoliberal ideology that presents information technology as con-
stituting a radically new society, one which promotes techno-optimism and 
techno-determinism. Garnham (1998/2004, 165), for example says that infor-
mation society theory is ‘the favoured legitimating ideology for the dominant 
economic and political powerholders’. Walter Runciman (1993, 65) argues that 
‘it cannot be claimed that any new sub-type of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion has emerged […] ‘Terms such as ‘managerial’ capitalism, or ‘late’ capital-
ism, or ‘finance’ capitalism, or ‘corporatist’ capitalism have all generated more 
confusion than illumination’ (Runciman 1993, 54; see also Freedman 2002).
This sceptical line of thought, while recognising that society has undergone 
profound changes, questions the assumption that we live in a radically new 
society. There is, however, also a variety within this approach. So, third, we 
find positions that argue that digital capitalism is the dominant dimension or 
type of contemporary capitalism. And fourth, there are positions that argue 
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that digital society/capitalism is a form or development that is subsumed under 
other modes of capitalist development.
The third type of argument argues that digital capitalism is the dominant di-
mension or type of contemporary capitalism. This assumption can be found in 
approaches that speak of cognitive capitalism. Cognitive capitalism theory has 
been advanced in particular by autonomist Marxist approaches. Yann Moulier- 
Boutang (2011) argues that cognitive capitalism is ‘founded on the accumula-
tion of immaterial capital, the dissemination of knowledge and the driving role 
of the knowledge economy’ (50). ‘We can distinguish three principal configura-
tions in the history of capitalism: first, mercantile capitalism, which was based 
on the hegemony of mechanisms of merchant and finance accumulation and 
developed between the start of the sixteenth century and the end of the seven-
teenth. Next came industrial capitalism, which was based on the accumulation 
of physical capital and the driving role of the large Manchester-style factory in 
mass-producing standardised goods. Then came cognitive capitalism’ (50) as 
the ‘third type of capitalism’ (56).
Jean-Marie Monnier and Carlo Vercellone (2010) argue that cognitive capi-
talism is ‘a new historical system of accumulation’, in which ‘the cognitive 
and intellectual dimensions of labour take on an increasingly important role 
and displace the previous centrality of fixed capital and material labour’ (76). 
‘[I]ndustrial capitalism succeeded mercantile capitalism, and then gave rise to 
a new historical system of accumulation called cognitive capitalism’ (76). ‘Cog-
nitive capitalism is the result of a restructuring process through which capital 
attempts to control collective conditions of knowledge production and tends to 
absorb and redirect its energy toward a new logic of capital accumulation’ (83).
Toni Negri (2008) speaks of ‘the era of cognitive capitalism’ that followed 
‘the phase of manufacturing and the subsequent phase of heavy industry. In 
this cognitive era the production of value depends increasingly on creative 
intellectual activity’ (64). ‘[I]mmaterial labor power (involved in communica-
tion, cooperation, and the production and reproduction of affects) occupies 
an increasingly central position in both the schema of capitalist production 
and the composition of the proletariat’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 53). Immaterial 
 labour constitutes ‘a third and current paradigm in which providing services 
and manipulating information are at the heart of economic production’ (Hardt 
and Negri 2000, 280). The ‘dominant figures of property in the contemporary 
era – including code, images, cultural products, patents, knowledge, and the 
like – are largely immaterial and, more important, indefinitely reproducible’ 
(Hardt and Negri 2017, 187). Toni Negri characterises the digital aspects of im-
material production as a digital assemblage (see his contribution to this book).
For Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, the move to digital capitalism ‘marks a shift from 
the cognitive model of conjunctive concatenation to a model of connective 
concatenation’ (2015, 11), by which he means a negation of embodied experi-
ence. Thus ‘with the digital, we have reached the end-point of this process of 
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increasing abstraction, and an apex in the increasing dissociation of under-
standing from empathy’ (17). This is of fundamental importance in under-
standing algorithmic governance through the reduction of the world to code 
and the digitalisation of the sign. For Beradi, the contemporary stage of capital-
ism is ‘semiocapitalism’, where language and economy combine. This is because 
any kind of production (whether material and immaterial) is a process of ‘com-
bination and recombination of information (algorithms, figures, digital differ-
ences)’ (113). Therefore, in this new stage, ‘digital abstraction adds a second 
layer to capitalist abstraction’’ (161). In this process of abstraction (following 
Baudrillard), signs proliferate and interact, losing any links to their original 
referents or meanings.
Berardi makes the important point that Big Data capitalism has implica-
tions for governance, in that the ‘abstract concatenation of technical functions 
replaces conscious elaboration, social negotiation, and democratic decision’ 
(Berardi 2015, 217). In other words, ‘the automatic connection of a-signifying 
segments replaces the dialogic elaboration of an order, and adaptation replaces 
consensus’ (Berardi 2015, 217). Algorithmic governance responds or adapts to 
perturbations and changes through pattern recognition rather than the crea-
tion of knowledge or an act of interpretation.
This separation or alienation from embodied processes of creativity and 
judgement is also taken up in Maurizio Lazzarato’s (2014) Signs and Machines. 
Lazzarato argues that Big Data capitalism can be understood as the production 
of subjectivity through machinic enslavement, a concept he takes from Deleuze 
and Guattari: an assemblage, which ‘no longer distinguishes between human 
and non-human, subject and object, or words and things’ (Lazzarato 2014, 13). 
By ‘enslavement’, Lazzarato means the cybernetic conception of automated 
governance, control and regulation, ‘ensuring the cohesion and equilibrium of 
the functioning whole’ (25). In this process, the human does not stand separate 
to or above the machine, but is contiguous with machines and inside machinic 
processes, as one more molecular component to be combined and recombined 
with others.
For Lazzarato, the rise of digital capitalism means that ‘one always acts within 
an assemblage, a collective, where machines, objects and signs are at the same 
time “agents’’’ (30). Capitalism is thus a ‘semiotic operator’ managing the flow 
of asignifying signs (without a subject as referent) which act directly on mate-
rial flows: ‘The sign machines of money, economics, science, technology, art, 
and so on, function in parallel or independently because they produce or con-
vey meaning and in this way bypass language, significations, and representa-
tion’ (60). Lazzarato also identifies transformative effects that produce Being 
and go beyond the Anthropocene. In this context he draws on the work of 
Bruno Latour:
Through asignifying semiotics machines ‘speak’, ‘express themselves’, 
and ‘communicate’ with man, other machines, and ‘real’ phenomena. 
Introduction 13
Through ‘power signs’ they interact with the expression and content of 
the atomic and chemical strata of matter, the biological strata of liv-
ing being […] Machines and asignifying semiotics are able to ‘see’ these 
strata, ‘hear’ them, ‘smell’ them, record them, order them, and tran-
scribe them, something that is impossible for human senses and lan-
guage. (87–88)
In the new forms of being and thought instantiated by digital capitalism, the 
subject is no longer interpolated as homo oeconomicus – a rational reflective 
subject. For Lazzarato, ‘we have moved beyond ‘“cognitive capitalism’’’ (100) 
and its privileging of dualistic linguistic and representational constructions of 
digital objects and digital subjects. Instead, we must take into full account the 
shift from ‘work’ to ‘process’ and from ‘subjection’ to ‘enslavement’ (119).
David Harvey is a representative of the fourth type of argument in relation 
to the question at what level of capitalism and society digital transformations 
should be situated. He has characterised contemporary capitalism as a regime 
of flexible accumulation (Harvey 1989), a new imperialism (Harvey 2003) and 
a form of neoliberal capitalism (Harvey 2005) that are based on the processes 
of accumulation by dispossession and financialisation. These constitute poten-
tials for actual crisis because real accumulation diverges from the accumula-
tion of fictitious capital. Digital technologies within this overall transformation 
of capitalism play, for Harvey, a mediating role. They are tools of time-space 
compression. ‘I use the word ‘compression’ because a strong case can be made 
that the history of capitalism has been characterized by speed-up in the pace of 
life, while so overcoming spatial barriers that the world sometimes seems to 
collapse inwards upon us’ (Harvey 1989, 240). For Harvey, these transformed 
conditions of capitalism require and call forth the development of digital 
technologies: ‘Computerization and electronic communications have pressed 
home the significance of instantaneous international coordination of financial 
flows’ (Harvey 1989, 161). ‘The production of space examines how new sys-
tems (actual or imagined) of land use, transport and communications, terri-
torial organization, etc. are produced, and how new modes of representation 
(e.g. information technology, computerized mapping, or design) arise’ (Harvey 
1989, 222).
In his most recent work Marx, Capital and the Madness of Economic Rea­
son, Harvey (2017) elaborates on the role of the digital in contemporary cap-
italism. ‘What was initially conceived as a liberatory regime of collaborative 
production of an open access commons has been transformed into a regime 
of hyper-exploitation upon which capital freely feeds. The unrestrained pil-
lage by big capital (like Amazon and Google) of the free goods produced by a 
self-skilled labour force has become a major feature of our times. This carries 
over into the so-called cultural industries’ (Harvey 2017, 96). ‘It is also interest-
ing that some of the most vigorous sectors of development in our times – like 
Google and Facebook and the rest of the digital labour sector – have grown 
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very fast on the back of free labour’ (Harvey 2017, 102). ‘Factory labour still 
dominates in some parts of the world (e.g. East Asia) but in North America and 
Europe it is much diminished and replaced by various other labour systems 
(digital labour and the like)’ (Harvey 2017, 57).
Harvey acknowledges the relevance of digital labour and digital capital today, 
but at the same time cautions against assuming that they constitute a new stage 
of development. He stresses the continued relevance of physical labour and 
the old inequality between capital and labour within the digital industries, as 
well as within capitalism as a whole. ‘In the case of digital labour, for example, 
labour practices have emerged that are uncannily similar to the putting out 
system of early textile manufacturing in Britain in the late eighteenth century’ 
(Harvey 2017, 104). This adds up to a redefinition of capital:
as money in motion rather than value in motion. Such a redefinition 
facilitates concentration on the churning speculative market in property 
rights to culture, knowledge and entrepreneurial endeavours as well as 
to the widespread practices of speculation in asset markets as the dis-
tinctive form of contemporary capitalism. Hence the claim that we are 
entering a new phase of capitalism in which knowledge is pre-eminent, 
and that a brilliant techno-utopia based on that knowledge and all its 
labour-saving innovations (such as automation and artificial intelli-
gence) is just around the corner or, as someone like Paul Mason main-
tains, already here. Such a redefinition may look about right from the 
perspective of Silicon Valley, but it falls flat on its face in the collaps-
ing factories of Bangladesh and the suicide-ridden employment zones 
of both industrial Shenzhen and rural India where microfinance has 
spread its net to foster the mother of all sub-prime lending crises.  
(Harvey 2017, 105).
Harvey also stresses that Big Data has turned into an ideological fetish: ‘The 
idea, for example, that the construction of smart cities managed through the 
mining of vast data sets can be the answer to all urban ills such that poverty, in-
equalities, class and racial discriminations and the extraction of wealth through 
evictions and other forms of accumulation by dispossession will all disappear is 
plainly ludicrous. It is counter-productive if not counter-revolutionary. It cre-
ates a fetish fog – a vast distraction – between political activism and the urban 
realities, pleasures and travails of daily life that need to be addressed’ (Harvey 
2017, 126).
These, then, are the main positions taken by authors in relation to the ef-
fect of Big Data capitalism upon society. There is ample evidence, however, to 
contest the first two positions (Fuchs 2008, 2014). The first one underestimates 
the continuities of power and capital. If we lived in a new type of society that 
was non-capitalist, then the crises of capitalism that usher in unemployment, 
precarity, nationalism and international conflicts would necessarily need to 
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have been abolished. But today we are experiencing an ongoing economic cri-
sis of capitalism, accompanied by a crisis of the state and political crises that 
have together constituted a legitimation crisis of political formations such as 
the European Union. The second position overestimates continuity and ends 
up with a static model of economic, political and societal development. It was 
one of Marx’s main insights that capitalism is a dynamic, complex, evolutionary 
system that lives and develops through the exploitation of labour, social strug-
gles and crises. Capitalism remains the same by changing itself. It develops the 
productive forces and differentiates the relations of economic and social pro-
duction in order to reproduce what Marx called ‘the whole old shit’3 (Marx and 
Engels 1845/1846a/1959, 35) of alienation and exploitation.
The emergence and differentiation of digital technologies is the consequence 
of the development of the productive forces that increase the organic composi-
tion of capital. Developing the productive forces requires an increasing role 
knowledge (the general intellect) and education in society and the economy 
so that quantitative increases at a certain point turn into new qualities (Fuchs 
2016b, 2014, 2008). The third and fourth positions do not agree at which level 
of capitalist organisation this shift takes place, but they do agree that capitalism 
is a dynamic system and that the emergence of digital machines, digital capital 
and digital labour is an expression of capitalist differentiation that today consti-
tutes a significant dimension of the capitalist economy and society.
The computer is a universal machine because it can turn many aspects of the 
world into digital patterns. This characteristic explains the ubiquity of com-
puting in everyday life. The apps on your smartphone have something to tell 
you about almost every situation you may find yourself in, from telling you 
what to do when you get lost in the streets to playing games on the Tube as a 
pastime. But the computer’s universality is not universal enough. It reduces life 
to calculability: zeros, ones and quantities. Computer algorithms cannot un-
derstand love, ethics, morals, solidarity, care, affects, and other distinct human 
qualities. The reduction of the human to computing and instrumental reason 
therefore also brings with it certain dangers, such as the application of digital 
machines for exploitation and domination. At the same time, the human use of 
computing also advances new potentials for cooperation, community, solidar-
ity, resistance and sociality that, even from within capitalism, point beyond it. 
The computer within capitalism is therefore the antagonistic digital machine. 
Digital and Big Data capitalism is an antagonistic societal formation that deep-
ens alienation and exploitation while at the same time advancing potentials for 
liberation (Fuchs 2017).
Contemporary capitalism is a complex unity of diverse interacting and 
mutually encroaching capitalisms, including finance capitalism, neoliberal 
capitalism, imperialism, digital/communicative capitalism, hyper-industrial 
capitalism, mobility capitalism, authoritarian capitalism and Big Data capi-
talism. (Fuchs 2014, Chapter 5). The relation of these dimensions is variable. 
Empirical studies of concrete capitalist phenomena in specific regimes of 
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space-time show which dimension is dominant for this specific phenomenon. 
For example, in 2014, 33.5% of the world’s largest 2,000 corporations’ profits 
were situated in the FIRE sector (finance, insurance and real estate), 19.0% in 
the mobility industries, 18.6% in the assemblage and manufacturing indus-
try, and 17.3% in the communication and information industry (see Fuchs 
2016a, Table 1). The data indicates that transnational corporations’ structures 
are to varying degrees characterised by finance capitalism, mobility capital-
ism, hyper-industrial capitalism and informational/communicative/digital 
capitalism. And these dimensions interpenetrate: digital media corporations 
in Silicon Valley and elsewhere are based on large injections of venture capital 
(a specific type of finance capital). Their goal is to make an initial public offer-
ing on the stock market. They are prone to creating financial bubbles. Digital 
communication is both cause and effect of mobility and time-space compres-
sion (Harvey 1989). As a consequence, the transportation of people and com-
modities has been growing and accelerating. Digital commodities and digital 
commons are not weightless goods. They require not just information labour, 
but also capital’s exploitation of the physical labour of miners and assemblers 
in Africa and China, who are situated in an international division of digital 
labour (Fuchs 2014).
Finance capitalism, mobility capitalism, hyper-industrial capitalism, digi-
tal capitalism and further capitalisms constitute a dialectical capitalist unity 
that consists of interrelated, contradictory moments. Capitalism is a unity of 
many capitalisms that develops dynamically and historically. A dimension that 
makes the picture even more complex is authoritarian capitalism. Authoritar-
ian capitalism is a form of capitalism that in recent times, in the context of the 
economic and political crisis of capitalism, has become strengthened, which 
poses the question of how neoliberal capitalism and authoritarian capitalism 
are related (Fuchs 2018).
Notes
 1 See: https://icts-and-society.net/events/digital-objects-digital-subjects-a-sym 
posium-on-activism-research-critique-in-the-age-of-big-data-capitalism- 
the-6th-icts-society-conference/
  2 This section was authored solely by Christian Fuchs.  
3 Translation from German to English [CF]. The English translation of 
this passage from The German Ideology in the Marx and Engels-Collected 
Works is, as in many other cases, imprecise, as it translates ‘die ganze alte 
Scheiße’ (Marx and Engels 1845/1846a/1957, 35) as ‘old filthy  business’ 
(Marx and Engels 1845/1846b/1976, 49). There are different types of 
filth, including dust, mould, rubble, rust, cigarette butts, food particles 
and shit. So shit is just one type of filth, although certainly a particularly 
unpleasant one that you do not want to find mixed into your food, which 
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of course happens under unsanitary industrial conditions that aim at the 
maximisation of profit at the expense of human health, which is why the 
Richard Linklater movie Fast Food Nation asks how the shit comes into 
the burgers that school children and others eat. There are indications that 
fast food sold in major chains is indeed poo fast food (MacDougall 2017). 
To just say that capitalism produces and reproduces filth is therefore an 
 underestimation. Marx’s original formulation got it right by stressing the 
connection of capitalism and shit. Capitalism is not just shit, but makes us 
get treated like shit, produce shit, consume and eat shit.
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